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Early Modernization Theory? The Eisenhower Administration and the Foreign Policy of 
Development in Brazil

 
 
Speaking in Sao Paulo, Brazil, in February 1960 President Dwight D. Eisenhower outlined 
his belief that Brazil was on the cusp of a significant breakthrough in terms of its economic 
position. 
 
At this point in history, our countries may differ in economic development, but 
this difference can and will disappear, for Brazil is on the march. It is today a 
universal Brazilian aspiration to develop the country's resources, to extend the 
blessings of education to all, to realize the nation's immense potentialities. Let 
me say to you most earnestly that we pray for your success. And we rejoice in 
your progress not only because you and we are friends but also because we 
know that the progress of Brazil and of all the nations which aspire to develop 
rapidly will make a happier and more peaceful world for everyone. 
 
Such developments, Eisenhower went on, were also important in terms of validating the US 
prescribed model of development. The progress being made in Sao Paulo, he noted, was a 
shining example of how development should be pursued. ‘I wish that all the world could see 
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what I have seen today in this city,’ he proclaimed, ‘a demonstration that a dynamic 
economy, based on private enterprise and free labor, redounds to the benefit of the worker, 
the consumer, the public at large and the state which embodies their sovereign will.’1  
Eisenhower’s enthusiastic portrayal of Brazilian development belied the fractious 
disagreements that had characterised US-Brazilian relations over economic issues for the 
duration of his presidency. It also overlooked the increasingly independent developmental 
path that Brazil had pursued since 1956, and the fact that his sentiments did not go down well 
with many Brazilians who disliked the president’s one-dimensional presentation, preaching 
of American success, and ongoing refusal to accord their nation any special significance in 
inter-American relations.
2
 For a presidency that accorded such significance to the message it 
presented, it is difficult not view this as having been deliberate. For Eisenhower’s comments 
also demonstrated the enduring faith that his administration had in their concept of 
development: the idea that, around the world, prosperity could be brought to the masses by 
following America’s own route to modernity.3  
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These sentiments, of course, had been increasingly prominent in American views of 
the world in the twentieth century and, as such, were not uncommon in the Eisenhower era. 
From his first inaugural address, through the Chance for Peace speech after Josef Stalin’s 
death, and on through the keynote speeches of his second term, the motif of development was 
a recurrent feature of US rhetoric toward the developing world.
4
 Examinations of the role that 
these constructions played in US policy, though, have tended to focus on the administration’s 
propagandistic intentions – eschewing the possibility of taking the notion of global 
development at face value, or interrogating in detail what precisely the administration’s 
conception of it was, and instead portraying the use of developmental idealism as a carefully 
contrived rhetorical effort to appeal to the ‘hearts and minds’ of the world’s underdeveloped 
nations.
5
 Likewise, broader studies of the administration’s approach toward what cold war 
historians often call the Third World (an area of the world that, loosely defined, took in much 
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of South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and Africa),
6
 which have 
portrayed Eisenhower’s policies as being ill-considered, negative and one-dimensional, have 
framed its foreign economic stance squarely within the confines of the Cold War and viewed 
it as being indicative of its failed approach toward the developing world.
7
 The burgeoning 
wave of anti-American sentiment that was in evidence by the end of the Eisenhower era, 
moreover, has only served to confirm these appraisals.
8
 Eisenhower’s foreign economic 
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policies have, therefore, been cast in a wholly negative light that, while instructive, presents a 
one-dimensional perspective.
9
 Rather than relying on existing arguments, then, it is also 
necessary to analyse the rigidity and construction of the developmental aspect: to ask what 
the administration wanted to achieve in terms of Third World development, assess whether or 
not there was any validity in their model and to examine what the broader ramifications of 
this are for the historiography of the Cold War. 
Narrow Cold War constructions undoubtedly hindered the Eisenhower 
administration’s position in the developing world; yet so, too, did the reliance on a generic – 
and ideologically entrenched – model of economic modernisation that proved incompatible 
with the desires of increasingly independent nation states in former colonial areas.
10
 Relative 
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stability in Europe, coupled with a more consistent pattern of events in Asia, meant that 
prosperity and stability in the Western Hemisphere were far more important than they had 
been in the immediate aftermath of World War Two.
11
 As the Brazilian case demonstrates, 
there was a clear and consistent conception of the idea of development among Eisenhower 
and his leading officials that, even at moments of strategic crisis in Latin America, never 
looked like wavering.
12
 Adopting this approach with respect to Eisenhower’s policy in Brazil, 
moreover, suggests the need to reperiodize the era of Modernization Theory – or, at least, 
elements of its central theoretical planks – and to reconsider the chronology of the Cold War 
in the region.
13
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Modernization, as David Ekbladh has argued, can be situated within a wider 
framework going back to the era of the Great Depression. This was apparent in Latin 
America where the Republican administrations of the 1920s concerned themselves with the 
concept in their examination of, and actions toward, indigenous economic structures.
14
 The 
Eisenhower administration’s approach, however, was different – coming in a period when the 
US had emerged as a superpower and the global context of the Cold War had become all-
pervasive (if slightly more stable).
15
 Set within this wider framework, then, the Eisenhower 
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era begins to look reminiscent of that of John F. Kennedy, whose embracement of 
Modernization Theory and implementation of the Alliance for Progress has typically been 
held up as a stark break with what came before.
16
 Indeed the Eisenhower administration 
shared significant characteristics with that of Kennedy. Both had preordained endpoints in 
mind (albeit with different timeframes); both saw their actions as morally imperative acts of 
benevolence, as well as a successful way of limiting the spread of communism and meeting 
broader US economic goals; and both, despite their different methods, held to generic 
blueprints that stipulated how a developing nation should move toward economic, and 
political, maturity. Though the vision of development and how quickly it could be undertaken 
among Eisenhower and his advisors differed enormously from the model put forward by 
prominent economic historian and architect of Kennedy-era Modernization, Walt Rostow, the 
ultimate goal was strikingly similar. In both eras, US officials sought to create economic 
structures that were modern, self-sufficient, diversified, and that would begin a process of 
social and democratic change. This would benefit the US, to be sure, but Eisenhower and 
Kennedy also believed it would benefit the Latin Americans. 
Thus when Rostow critiqued Eisenhower’s approach in the Third World he did so 
specifically with regard to the methods used, not with respect to what they were trying to 
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achieve.
17
 In testimony to a Congressional committee in 1958, Rostow stated that, to achieve 
America’s global objectives in the developing areas, would require ‘an American economic 
development effort larger in scale, greater in continuity, with criteria for lending vastly less 
ambiguous (and economically more hard-headed) than our present programs.’18 He expanded 
on this in The Stages of Economic Growth, where he argued that the biggest question 
confronting the US was: 
 
whether the United States and the West can mobilize their ample resources to do 
the jobs that must be done – resources of spirit, intellect, will and insight quite as 
much as steel and electronic gadgets; and which extend not only to missile 
arsenals and the further diffusion of welfare at home, but to the Indian second and 
third Five Year Plans and the far reaches of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and 
Latin America.
19
  
 
These were not recommendations for wholesale changes in US objectives; rather they were a 
call for utilising different methods to reach ostensibly desirable endpoints. 
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Nevertheless the escalating critiques of Eisenhower’s developmental policy in the late 
1950s, which typically cited his approach as having a deleterious impact on America’s Cold 
War position, had an inevitable effect on inter-American relations: they ensured that, under a 
new administration, a more forceful approach would be taken to fostering development in 
Latin America.
20
 But it does not necessarily follow that, Eisenhower’s lack of success 
notwithstanding, critics such as Rostow were correct. The course of Latin American 
development, as the Eisenhower administration believed it should be, has been a gradual and 
lengthy process.
21
 Attempts to provide a catalyst for this process via large scale assistance in 
the 1960s – although initially popular with Latin American governments – ultimately proved 
unsuccessful. Assessing Eisenhower’s development policy toward Brazil within the context 
of reperiodizing the era of Modernization, then, not only resituates his administration’s 
policies in a more proactive context, but also widens the debate over the origins of the 
Alliance for Progress. Several scholars have cited policy changes late in Eisenhower’s 
second-term as being initial steps on the road toward the Alliance; taking a longer view of the 
administration’s stance on development, however, alters this perception. Eisenhower did, in 
some ways, pre-empt the Alliance, yet this was more to do with a long-standing belief in the 
merits of American-led modernization than any emerging faith in engineering economic 
                                                          
20
 On the Kennedy campaign’s criticism of Eisenhower’s policies and the planning and theory regarding the 
Alliance for Progress, S.G. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts 
Communism in Latin America (Chapel Hill, 1999); M.E. Latham, ‘Ideology, Social Science, and Destiny: 
Modernization and the Kennedy-Era Alliance for Progress,’ Diplomatic History Volume 22, No. 2 (Spring 
1998), 199-229 
 
21
 F. Fukyama (eds), Falling Behind: Explaining the Development Gap Between Latin America and the United 
States (New York, 2008) 
 
11 
 
change through financial assistance.
22
 Forged in the annals of American history – and further 
buttressed by an ingrained belief in the suitability of the American model for developing 
nations and perennial thinking on US racial superiority over Latin Americans – the 
administration’s rigid stance on development thus assumes an important role in the narrative 
of inter-American relations in the Cold War, and makes the case study of Brazil as useful for 
assessing US policy in the 1950s as the oft-cited examples of Guatemala and Cuba.
23
 
Brazil serves as such a powerful demonstration of the effect that this developmental 
model exerted over the Eisenhower administration’s Latin American policy because it was on 
the way toward a position of ‘economic modernity’ by the early 1950s.24 Successive 
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governments in Rio de Janeiro, moreover, were committed to programmes of reform and 
modernisation, and were eager to work with Washington to achieve these goals. Close allies 
in World War Two, where a mutually beneficial relationship had developed based in part on 
US funding for a state-owned steel plant at Volta Redonda, Brazilian hopes were high that 
this would continue in the post-1945 era.
25
 After the war, though, the relationship oscillated 
between one of neglect on the US side and later, in the wake of the Korean War, one that 
looked to regenerate aspects of the wartime relationship.
26
  
During the Eisenhower era, other factors – including a close relationship between the 
Department of Defense and the Brazilian military, as well as the fluctuating nature of the 
Brazilian polity which saw different pressure groups and factions able to exert an immense 
amount of influence over the political situation – impacted upon the relationship.27 Yet in 
spite of a strong record of cooperation on issues regarding the Cold War, there was little 
prospect of an agreement on developmental matters as Brazilian and American officials 
adopted different views as to how Brazil should move forward. Brazilian officials believed 
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that the judicious use of loan payments to alleviate short-term inflation and balance of 
payment problems – through institutions like the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im), the World 
Bank (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – would prove sufficient to enable 
more rapid development to take place. The US, however, was strongly opposed to this 
viewpoint. For successful development to occur, US officials consistently argued, Brazil 
needed to implement fundamental changes to its economy (such as economic diversification, 
increased receptiveness to foreign investment in all areas – especially those, like petroleum, 
which were especially attractive to the US – and currency reform). Any attempts to operate 
outside of these dictums were seen as deeply misguided by US officials, citing such 
behaviour as typical of the Brazilian nation as a whole and reinforcing assumptions about the 
need for a firm US hand on the tiller. 
The recurrent difficulties that Eisenhower subsequently faced, as his developmental 
vision clashed with that of the Brazilians, should have served as a cautionary tale for the 
modernizationists that followed under Kennedy. In spite of some good intentions (and, of 
course, just as many self-interested ones as well), a clear conception of what needed to 
happen and an acceptance among Brazilian government officials that this private-investment 
led model could work, the administration palpably failed to achieve its developmental aims in 
the Latin American nation with the greatest economic potential. The great unsolved problem, 
which existed throughout Eisenhower’s two terms, was the stark difference between the US-
prescribed, generic view of development and the situation on the ground in Brazil.  
 
The belief that the American model could serve as a route to modernity for other 
nations to follow has long been a prominent theme in US thinking.
28
 This belief was given a 
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boost in the post-World War Two era – when not only did the US envision itself reshaping 
the world in the wake of a cataclysmic global war as evidenced by the Marshall Plan, but was 
doing so in the midst of an all-encompassing struggle with the Soviet Union.
29
 Throughout 
the 1950s and on into the following decade, American social scientists worked to apply 
academic theories of development and modernisation to the practice of American foreign 
policy – building upon the long-standing trait of exceptionalism, fusing it with the 
geopolitical priorities of the Cold War, and creating a blueprint for fostering modern nations 
in the developing world. Ultimately this would coalesce into ‘modernization theory’. 
 
As the only non-Communist theory promoting a radical rethinking of 
development on the basis of a totalising reconstruction of the post-war 
geopolitical and geo-economic social order, modernization theory dovetailed with 
the interests of the foundations in promoting the moral and material interests of 
the United States in the emergent post-war world order.
30
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Even before this phrasing entered the political lexicon during the Kennedy administration, 
though, elements of it were beginning to take root in US policy. Under Eisenhower some of 
the core ideas regarding economic development in the Third World became highly prominent; 
in particular, the idea that progress could be achieved via a singular developmental model. 
One of the most significant impacts that this had – which went beyond even that which had 
been evident in earlier periods – was to make alternative models, even those not that far 
removed from the US vision like that advocated by Brazilian leaders in the 1950s, 
redundant.
31
 
The Eisenhower model, like the Rostovian framework that followed, was tightly 
defined – focused heavily on the theory of using the expansion of private capital to drive 
growth, a move toward unrestricted trade and regulated use of loans from institutions like the 
Ex-Im Bank and the IMF. This approach was inspired by the administration’s fear of Soviet 
incursions into the developing world and the attendant belief that the US should be at the 
vanguard of any widespread move toward economic modernisation in these areas. Yet it was 
also motivated by a mixture of the administration’s ingrained developmental beliefs, the wider 
imperatives of a new national security strategy and a clear understanding that such an 
approach was of clear benefit to the US. Amid a global situation of great complexity, a 
gradual model of development was deemed necessary. As Eisenhower wrote in his diary in 
January 1953, ‘Nationalism is on the march and world communism is taking advantage of that 
spirit…to cause dissension in the free world…on the one side lies slavery, preceded possibly 
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by momentary independence...On the other side lies possibly a slower and more orderly 
progress toward independence but with the certainty that it will then be healthy and sound.’32  
In a speech delivered to Congress in 1954, Eisenhower outlined his administration’s 
stance on the issue of foreign economic policy, organising it around the key principles of: 
‘Aid – which we wish to curtail’, ‘Investment – which we wish to encourage’, ‘Convertibility 
– which we wish to facilitate’, and ‘Trade – which we wish to expand.’ Adopting these broad 
principles, he went on, was crucial:  
As we curtail our aid, we must help to close the dollar gap by expanding our 
foreign investment and trade. This expansion will be facilitated by a return to 
convertibility of foreign currencies. The return by our friends abroad to 
convertibility will be encouraged if our trade policy leads them to expect 
expansion of our foreign trade and investment.
33
  
Other officials – particularly Treasury Secretary George Humphrey – shared the president’s 
standpoint with respect to fiscal prudence.
34
 Faith in the idea of development driven by 
private capital, though, was shared by officials less wedded to the president’s position on 
fiscal matters. Across the administration, senior and mid-level officials remained committed 
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to the core idea of private investment funded development. Indeed, Eisenhower’s Secretary of 
State, John Foster Dulles – who was by no means as stringent as the president on matters of 
foreign aid – told an audience in Chicago: ‘Today it is the United States which has the most 
capital available to help develop other countries. We must find a way to make our capital 
work for such development.’35  
 The impetus for this model, then, came from a number of sources and can be discerned 
in statements made by the administration from its first years in office. More importantly, 
though, there was little attempt – nor would there be during the administration’s two terms – 
to examine how, or indeed whether, this model could be applied to individual nations. This is 
particularly pertinent for the case study of Brazil. For a nation that, ostensibly, could be 
expected to move toward development in this period was faced with the prospect of doing so 
via a generic and one-dimensional model. And while this was viewed as being right by those 
in Washington, it was a source of intense frustration for Brazilians. The same was true, 
moreover, of other nations in the region. To a certain extent, US officials recognised this and, 
as was typical in the Cold War, they had a contingency plan. With this developmental model 
viewed as being a long-term project the US would, in the meantime, rely on supporting 
authoritarian regimes, using covert operations, establishing military assistance agreements 
and, in urgent cases, small aid payments to ensure political stability across the region.
36
 In 
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Brazil, this would translate into cultivating a close relationship with the Brazilian military and 
a strong bilateral stance on the issues regarding the Cold War.  
Beyond these ideas the administration reflexively believed that a strict adherence to 
their private capital model would ultimately result in regions and nations that were 
prosperous, pro-American and, eventually, democratic. During his second inaugural address, 
in 1957, Eisenhower outlined this vision in global terms.  
 
Everywhere we see the seeds of the same growth that America itself has known. 
The American experiment has, for generations, fired the passion and the courage 
of millions elsewhere seeking freedom, equality, opportunity. And the American 
story of material progress has helped excite the longing of all needy peoples for 
some satisfaction of their human wants. These hopes that we have helped to 
inspire, we can help to fulfil.
37
 
 
Ideologically the administration had a clear conception of how they believed progress 
could be achieved in the developing world. In terms of policy, however, there is far less 
evidence of a clear step-by-step approach – particularly with respect to how private 
investment should be encouraged to take root in underdeveloped nations.
38
 During the 
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Operation Solarium process and the policy debates that led up to the creation of the New 
Look foreign policy (set forth in the document NSC 162/2), the issue of foreign economic 
policy rarely came up as officials focused on outlining a general national security strategy.
39
 
When it was raised there was a clear consensus as to what the administration’s position 
should be: first, the underdeveloped areas of the world had to be assisted in their move 
toward development; and second, the US should do this by strongly encouraging growth via 
private investment, trade and open markets. At a meeting of the [N]ational [S]ecurity 
[C]ouncil, Treasury Secretary Humphrey asserted that American ‘assistance to other 
countries should be on the decline in the near future’ – a sentiment that gained general 
approval from those present.
40
 The final version of NSC 162/2 – although short on specifics 
as to how US financial policy in the Third World might work – was thus unequivocal in its 
stance on foreign economic assistance. ‘It should be possible in the near future,’ the 
document stated, ‘to eliminate most grant economic aid, if coupled with appropriate US 
economic and trade policies.’41 The administration’s enduring faith in this approach was 
based on the belief that the American model was not only transferable to the developing 
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world, but also that nations seeking to modernise would embrace such a model in preference 
to that of the Soviet Union.
42
  
In Latin America, and therefore Brazil, these same principles were apparent – forming 
the basis of the administration’s developmental approach. NSC 144/1, finalised in early 1953, 
outlined the stance on development clearly.  
The United States should seek to assist in the economic development of Latin 
America by…encouraging Latin American governments to recognize that the bulk 
of the capital required for their economic development can best be supplied by 
private enterprise and that their own self-interests requires the creation of a 
climate which will attract private investment.
43
  
Additional encouragement would be provided through loans by approved institutions, but 
essentially, the argument outlined in the annex to the report would hold true: ‘Our objective is 
to facilitate the supporting role of US capital in developing Latin American economies...this 
role is principally played by US private capital, and we seek to maximize it by encouraging a 
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better climate in Latin America for foreign enterprise.’44 In a nation where economic 
nationalism was rife, like Brazil, this approach faced obvious difficulties – as, irrespective of 
the potential benefits, it was going to be inordinately difficult to persuade Brazilian 
nationalists that the greater good could be served by welcoming American capital or gearing 
Brazil’s economy toward the model advocated by Washington. Any dissent, however, was 
brushed aside by US officials – ascribed to Latin American immaturity or over-excitability, 
rather than a valid critique of the US model.
45
 
To be sure, the administration’s initial policy did undergo some alterations in the face 
of shifting regional and global patterns. Guiding development would be matched by a stark 
determination to keep the region securely within the US sphere of influence.
46
 The crucial 
point here, however, is that the administration’s economic model – even in the face of 
emerging crises – would remain constant. In terms of development, the administration would 
hold true to its initial principles; assistance was designed to facilitate and encourage private 
investment, not replace it.
47
 Indeed, NSC 5902/1 – the administration’s final policy statement 
for the region – stated that the US should ‘encourage’ the Latin Americans to ‘make 
maximum contribution’ to their own development, ‘base their economies on a system of free 
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private enterprise’ and to ‘take all feasible steps to create a political and economic climate 
conducive to private investment, both foreign and domestic.’48 Even the creation of a Social 
Progress Fund in 1960 was a response to concern about developing anti-American sentiments 
rather than evidence of a shift in developmental theory. Thus while the administration did 
become more amenable to the idea of providing aid to help nations suffering severe 
deprivations, it remained wholly committed to the idea that economic development should 
occur via the American model. Eisenhower reiterated this during a press conference in Rhode 
Island in the summer of 1960. ‘The only real investment that is going to flow into countries 
that will be useful to them in the long term, is private investment. It is many times the amount 
that can be put in from the public coffers.’49 
When applied to Brazil, this rigid developmental model had major ramifications. In 
other areas – particularly those relating to the Cold War, or bilateral military relations – there 
was a consistent level of accord between Washington and Rio de Janeiro. On the economic 
front, though, there was growing disenchantment; between 1953 and 1961, the tone of the 
relationship was increasingly undermined by perpetual disagreements over the question of 
development. As with their wider regional policy, the Eisenhower administration saw no 
reason to alter its approach: to their minds, Brazilian development should be guided by US-
prescribed principles and no progress could be made towards a compromise until Brazilian 
officials accepted this wholeheartedly. The inability of successive Brazilian governments to 
tackle ongoing balance of payment and inflationary problems, moreover, was seen by US 
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officials as further proof that the country needed to be schooled in more appropriate 
economic practices.  
 
Brazil’s president in 1953, Getulio Vargas, saw the Eisenhower administration as a 
potential ally. Officials in Rio believed that a Republican president was more likely to view 
Brazil in a positive manner and adopt an approach that prioritised Brazil’s position in the 
region.
50
 Just a month before Eisenhower’s inauguration, Vargas’s finance minister, Oswaldo 
Aranha, wrote to John Foster Dulles and informed him: ‘Brazil remains today as in the past 
the country though which the United States can most directly influence the orientation of the 
hemisphere nations.’51 By contrast, the Eisenhower administration wanted to ‘normalise’ the 
US relationship with Brazil – removing any notion that Brazil enjoyed a special relationship 
with Washington in order to boost hemispheric relations – and, beyond that, to make progress 
in persuading the Brazilians to adopt the US developmental model. Close ties between the US 
and Brazilian militaries, pending military agreements and a commonality of strategic interests 
were believed to be sufficient to ensure relative diplomatic stability. In the meantime, the 
administration moved quickly to initiate decisive steps on the economic front. 
A Brazilian request for a $300 million balance of payments assistance loan from the 
Ex-Im Bank provided the immediate catalyst. The loan had been promised by the outgoing 
Truman administration, but was clearly inimical to the new administration’s developmental 
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vision.
52
 Consequently there was little support for the loan among leading advisors in the 
White House, the Department of State or the Treasury Department. Only Thomas Mann – a 
mid-level State Department official – cautioned against rejecting the request, warning that do 
so would ‘create a serious risk that Brazil will become more nationalistic and less cooperative 
in its relations with us.’53 Foster Dulles’s response was more typical; he quickly informed 
Eisenhower that to provide the loan would set a bad example as any ‘country who wants to 
yell “communism” will come in for loans’ and suggested that any payment be dramatically 
reduced.
54
 Ultimately the US was compelled to pay the full amount due to fears that any 
failure to do so would leave the new administration ‘open to possible charges of bad faith 
with regard to commitments made with the old Administration.’ The episode, however, had 
been a clear sign of the administration’s intent.55 
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Although viewed as a missed opportunity by the administration, it is the immediacy of 
the US decision that is the most striking aspect of the loan request episode.
56
 Most 
importantly, it came at the same time that a viewpoint was developing that held that 
providing funds to alleviate an ongoing financial problem made little practical sense if 
identical difficulties were likely to re-emerge in the not-too-distant future. Critics – like 
Thomas Mann – cited the political consequences of such a stance, but their views were given 
an unsympathetic hearing. While ideologically consistent with the administration’s 
developmental stance, however, this view rejected the Brazilian point: that development via 
private investment was indeed desirable, but that public funds would also be necessary at 
times of financial difficulty.
57
  
In an effort to make this point to the US, Vargas dispatched a trusted emissary to meet 
with Treasury Secretary Humphrey to offer the US a deal: ‘If the US government does not 
insist on specific quid pro quos for the several measures of cooperation and assistance which 
Brazil needs from the US,’ the emissary stated, ‘the Brazilian Government will…succeed in 
adopting legislation which will attract foreign capital into industries which will expand 
production of basic necessities and strengthen the fabric of Brazilian society.’58 In 
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Washington, this was viewed as an attempt to elicit US assistance without taking corrective 
measures – such as opening up petroleum reserves to private capital, limiting government 
spending to tackle inflation, and looking to diversify economic output away from a reliance 
on coffee exports – and was subsequently rejected. 
The administration took the same stance with respect to the Joint Brazil United States 
Economic Development Commission (Joint Commission), which had been created in 1950 to 
provide funding for approved economic projects. From its inception, the Joint Commission 
had failed to live up to its promise as the World Bank assumed a position of primacy over the 
provision of loans and refused to sanction proposals not deemed to be economically viable.
59
 
Following on from their position on the Brazilian loan request the Eisenhower administration 
informed Vargas in the spring of 1953 that they had decided to terminate the Commission. 
Despite Brazilian concerns over the political ramifications, US officials saw this as an 
effective way of closing off a source of funding that was at odds with their developmental 
agenda. Herschell Johnson, the US Ambassador in Brazil, confirmed this in a telegram. 
‘There is very little doubt in my mind,’ he cabled the State Department, ‘that [the] Vargas 
administration hopes for further extensive financing from US and is therefore reluctant [to] 
see technical termination [of the] Joint Commission, which provides convenient machinery 
for these expanded hopes.’60  
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There were obvious diplomatic dangers with this approach. Terminating the 
Commission, however desirable from an economic standpoint, was certain to have a 
detrimental impact on US-Brazilian relations.
61
 This was a point noted by British observers 
who, in a scribbled note on the front of a Foreign Office memorandum, wrote: ‘The economic 
factors for withdrawing the US element of the Joint Commission are no doubt strong, but I 
am surprised that the U.S.G should take the political risks involved.’62 The view in 
Washington, though, was that the economic benefits outweighed any political costs. 
Subsequently – and in the face of opposition from Merwin Bohan, the leading US official on 
the Commission
63
 – Dulles sent word that it was to be terminated alongside a warning that 
any remaining funding would be dependent upon this being ‘within Brazil’s borrowing 
capacity to prevent the over-extension of credit and default of repayments.’ There would be 
no ‘advance commitments’ of capital, he went on, that were not ‘unrelated to Brazil’s 
financial position.’64 
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In part, this approach toward Brazil was dictated by the desire to make the US-
Brazilian relationship equivalent to that between Washington and the other Latin American 
states. The president’s brother, Milton, outlined the theory behind this in October. ‘The 
leaders and peoples of all Latin American countries are proud and sensitive,’ he wrote. ‘They 
could easily be offended if we indicated in any way that our relations with the largest powers 
of Latin America are more important to us than our relations with the smaller ones.’65 Dulles 
agreed, informing the president: ‘American goals in Brazil could be affected best within our 
present program of increased attention to all the countries of this area.’66 Again, the potential 
dangers of this were noted internally – with one official voicing his concern that ‘we can not 
expect to keep friends by blows’67 – but the broader regional perspective was given priority. 
This process was pretty much complete by 1954, a fact attested to by an Operations 
Coordinating Board report that confirmed, ‘Brazil is annoyed by the fact that whereas 
formerly Presidents of the United States and Secretaries of State treated Brazil as an 
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important country, she is now relegated, along with Haiti and Honduras, as another Latin 
American republic.’68  
The economic motivations for US policy were, however, just as important; US actions 
over the Ex-Im loan and the Joint Commission had demonstrated the impact that 
developmental ideology could have on US policy as well as the way that such considerations 
could override diplomatic concerns. And though little tangible progress had been made in 
improving Brazilian efforts to adopt the US model, this was consistent with the wider 
regional trend where success had been hard to come by.
69
 The administration’s enduring 
belief in its approach was buttressed by the relatively favourable strategic position in the 
region – a factor that only became more entrenched by the US-supported ousting of the 
leftist-leaning and possible communist, Jacobo Arbenz, from Guatemala in June 1954.
70
 The 
fact that a regime stridently advocating an alternative model in the region had been 
                                                          
68
 Abilene, EL, Memorandum for the Executive Officer of the OCB by Charles H. Taquey, 6 May 1954, OCB 
091.4, Latin America (File#1) (4) March – June 1954, Box No 71, OCB Central File Series 
 
69
 Memorandum from Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith to the Executive Secretary of the National 
Security Council James Lay, ‘First Progress Report on NSC 144/1’, 23 July 1953, FRUS 1952-1954 Volume IV, 
10-26; Memorandum from Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith to the Executive Secretary of the 
National Security Council James Lay, ‘Second Progress Report on NSC 144/1’,  20 Nov. 1953, FRUS 1952-
1954 Volume IV, 26-44 
 
70
 Rabe, Eisenhower Ch. 3; P. Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The United States and the Guatemalan Revolution, 
1944-1954 (New Haven, 1991); G. Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War 
(Chicago, 2004); R.H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin, Texas, 
1983); N. Cullather, Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954 
(Stanford, California, 1999) 
 
30 
 
neutralised – albeit at some political cost – helped Eisenhower officials to believe that they 
had the regional security situation in hand (a belief furthered by their success in de-
radicalizing a revolutionary government in Bolivia).
71
 Furthermore – and, as it turned out, 
erroneously – this perceived demonstration of the US capacity to ensure the region’s stability 
provided the justification for continuing with this long-term push toward US-led 
development. 
Following these initial moves, Washington’s economic position toward Brazil 
remained constant in 1954 and 1955. Notably Vargas’s suicide in August 1954, which 
threatened the stability of the Brazilian political system, the subsequent intransigence of an 
interim administration and the 1955 presidential election all failed to provide the spark for 
any reconsideration in US economic policy. With there being little evidence that Brazilian 
officials were prepared to heed US advice with respect to economic stabilisation and 
development, there was no impetus in Washington for a shift in policy. Nevertheless, there 
were modifications elsewhere in the US approach. The immediate aftermath of Vargas’s 
suicide – which had led to outbreaks of anti-American protests due to the tone of the 
Brazilian leader’s valedictory letter72 – compelled Dulles to turn to an experienced trouble-
shooter: James Dunn – the US representative in Madrid and formerly US Ambassador to 
Italy. Stressing the importance of this task, Dulles informed Dunn: ‘I am told that you do not 
look with favour on a tour of duty in Brazil…I do want personally to urge you to reconsider 
the possibility of a year to eighteen months in Rio…I want you to know from me personally 
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that I feel the situation in Brazil is one with peculiarly calls for you ability and type of 
expertise.’73  
Following Vargas’s death, an interim administration – headed by former vice 
president, Joao Café Filho – assumed control in Rio until the next scheduled presidential 
election in 1955. Like its predecessor, the Café Filho government recognised that ongoing 
financial problems would require an injection of short-term fiscal assistance. US appraisals, 
though, painted a picture of an economy – and a nation – in trouble. ‘Although the new 
cabinet was competent, experienced, conservative, and pro-US,’ the Deputy Director of the 
CIA told Eisenhower’s National Security Council, ‘it would have to face a number of 
difficult problems, including inflation, a foreign exchange crisis, lack of parliamentary 
majority and national and state elections.’74 Time agreed. ‘Brazil's headaches and growing 
pains are proportionately huge,’ the magazine noted. ‘The country is racked by inflation, is 
desperately short of development capital and pitifully dependent on its one big export, 
coffee.’75 The US response, as before, was to maintain a position of economic consistency. 
Thus, very limited aid would be provided via the Ex-Im and the IBRD to relieve impending 
financial disaster, but only as a palliative measure and only after Brazil was seen to be taking 
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the corrective steps US officials believed to be necessary. This approach was set forth by an 
official in the Office of Financial and Development policy, who penned a memorandum 
which would essentially serve as the bedrock of US lending policy toward Brazil in the 
coming years. ‘The US should extend aid to Brazil, but this should not be in one large sum,’ 
he wrote. ‘It should be extended piece-meal, and in each case without commitment to further 
amounts, which would depend upon developments and Brazil’s progress in a constructive 
program.’76 The administration remained committed to this approach, moreover, in spite of 
its obvious political ramifications. ‘This is sound financial practice,’ a State Department 
official reported in early-1955, ‘but is leading to an unsuccessful impasse because Brazil does 
not agree.’77 At no stage were Brazilian concerns accorded any credence; they might not 
agree, US officials stressed, but this was because they were wrong. The overriding belief that 
US officials continued to hold in their approach, coupled with their paternalistic appraisal of 
the Brazilian people, allowed them to bypass the fact that the model they were advocating so 
strongly was one which was of most benefit to the US. 
 
The prospect of an election in Brazil in late 1955 raised US hopes that a more 
cooperative phase on economic issues might be in the offing. Henry Holland, the State 
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Department’s leading advisor on Latin American affairs, recommended that the US should 
hold true to its abiding principles before the election as this would ensure that future relations 
were begun on a sound footing. ‘The next government,’ Holland asserted, ‘will be 
conditioned by what we do with the present government. Over the long term I think it’s best 
for us to maintain close scrutiny over any credit we extend. This provides a lever to bring 
them back to a course of righteousness and sobriety and should help to postpone further 
crisis.’78 Holland also made this point to Brazilian officials in a less condescending manner. 
‘Only the Brazilians could take the necessary steps to prevent further problems in the future,’ 
he told the Brazilian Ambassador in Washington, before later travelling to Rio and informing 
officials there: ‘The United States looks on Brazil as an ally and a friend of long standing’ 
and ‘desires to assist Brazil in its present difficulties in the role of a partner and not that of a 
banker.’79  
In October, Juscelino Kubitschek – the former governor of the state of Minas Gerais, 
and a man who had campaigned on a pledge to achieve ‘fifty years of progress in five 
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[years]’ – was elected as Brazil’s new president.80 Kubitschek was well aware that, if Brazil 
was to become a modern nation, attracting large amounts of private investment was crucial. 
Shortly after his election he met with Ambassador Dunn at the US Embassy and spoke of his 
desire ‘to visit the US as part of his drive to attract American capital for his economic 
projects’ and ‘discuss some of his economic plans with our officials and private financial 
circles.’81 (US officials, it bears noting, had already taken the decision to invite the new 
leader to America.
82
) During his subsequent trip to the US, Kubitschek was highly receptive 
to ideas regarding development in meetings with Eisenhower and Foster Dulles – telling 
Dulles that he would ‘welcome the participation of American capital in the development of 
Brazil’ and that ‘the primary purpose of his campaign was to establish that kind of political 
stability that would make Brazil interesting as a field for investment.’83 To reiterate this point, 
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Kubitschek ended his trip by giving a speech in New York where he pledged to ‘foster free 
enterprise and assist the role of foreign capital in the development of his country’s vast 
resources.’84 
Yet Kubitschek was also aware that long-standing problems were liable to complicate 
his relationship with the US. Nationalist elements in Brazil – who, despite being an ad-hoc 
collective of different factions and groups, were able to wield a significant amount of 
political power – remained opposed to any significant escalation in the role played by foreign 
private capital. ‘There are powerful forces in Brazil,’ an internal report affirmed, ‘which 
advocate more nationalistic policies and the possibility of discrimination against US capital 
cannot be overlooked.’85 Worse were the problems posed by high inflation and increasing 
balance of payments deficits; if these factors could not be addressed then attracting private 
capital to Brazil would be highly difficult. For his part, Kubitschek recognised that loan 
requests to solve these problems were certain to be rejected. His approach, therefore, was to 
improve the prospects for attaining increased economic assistance by demonstrating Brazil’s 
support for US strategic interests. The most obvious example came with Kubitschek’s 
support for the Pentagon’s request to construct a missile tracking station on the Brazilian 
island of Fernando de Noronha.
86
 As the negotiations reached an impasse – with the 
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competing interests of the two governments, the Pentagon, the Brazilian Army, the Brazilian 
Congress and assembled nationalist groups making things highly complicated – Kubitschek’s 
role was crucial in bringing the negotiations to a close.
87
 
Much to Kubitschek’s annoyance, however, Washington refused to alter its stance. 
Though he welcomed close cooperation in any area, as he told the new US Ambassador in 
Rio, Ellis Briggs, ‘it is closer and more effective economic collaboration that he has primarily 
on his mind.’88 But this stance did not match that in Washington where, in the wake of a 
Soviet economic presence in the region, US officials had restated their stance on 
development. This position, in fact, was strongly reaffirmed in a report created by the 
International Development Advisory Board. ‘It is the policy of the United States to encourage 
the development of the free world’s resources as much as possible though private enterprise,’ 
the report stated unequivocally.
89
 
Perhaps the biggest single challenge to the US drive to implement their economic 
vision in Brazil, however, came in the wake of Richard Nixon’s trip to the region in the 
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spring of 1958 that saw the vice president come under attack in Caracas, Venezuela.
90
 Before 
the Nixon trip, Washington’s economic stance toward Brazil had hardened: as concerns about 
Brazil’s financial problems grew – a stance that overlooked the tangible progress being made 
on the ground there following the implementation of Kubitschek’s ambitious economic plans 
– the Eisenhower administration decreed that no further assistance would be forthcoming 
until Brazil reached an agreement with the IMF.
91
 With long-standing concerns about 
Brazil’s economy exacerbated by a report which revealed that, by the end of 1957, Brazil’s 
gold and dollar holdings, crucial in providing the financing to repay existing loans or as 
collateral for further loans, had fallen by 21 percent or $125 million, US officials were 
content to refer Brazil to the IMF.
92
 Furthermore they knew that the IMF would insist upon a 
set of financial criteria perfectly in tune with prevailing US attitudes being met before any 
financial assistance would be forthcoming.
93
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Following the climactic end to Nixon’s trip in 1958, Kubitschek again sought to align 
Brazil with US interests. He expressed his desire to help Washington reaffirm the spirit of 
Pan-Americanism and, in a letter to Eisenhower, stated: ‘the ideal of Pan American unity has 
suffered serious impairment…It would be utterly inconvenient and unfair to allow this false 
impression to prevail, morally weakening the cause of democracy.’94 This brought a positive 
response from the US.
95
 Kubitschek’s initial goal was to demonstrate his diplomatic support 
for Washington. Yet he also wanted to press Eisenhower on the idea of ‘underdevelopment’, 
which he outlined as being the major threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere.
96
 In 
general terms, of course, the US broadly agreed with him; they, too, wanted to tackle 
underdevelopment in the region and, indeed, on 20 June 1958, John Foster Dulles told 
Ambassador Ellis Briggs, ‘We are impressed with Kubitschek’s statesmanlike motivations 
and disassociation of US-Brazilian bilateral interests from the broader consideration of 
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strengthening Pan-Americanism,’ before giving his assent for further exploration of 
Kubitschek’s idea.97  
Support for Kubitschek’s proposal, however, quickly evaporated once it became clear 
that he was envisaging something akin to a ‘Marshall Plan’ for Latin America. Kubitschek 
saw such public funding as being a way to bypass the financial obstacles that were hindering 
development in the region; he did not see it as a replacement of private capital, more a 
conduit toward encouraging it.
98
 US officials, on the other hand, saw it as marking an overly 
dramatic shift – one that rejected the US desire for gradual economic process and which put 
too much emphasis on rapid development while positing an alternative Brazilian model to 
that emanating from Washington.   
On 20 June, the same day as Dulles’s message to Briggs, Kubitschek gave a speech in 
which he outlined his proposal in more detail. ‘It is difficult to spread the democratic ideal 
and proclaim the excellence of private enterprise in the world,’ Kubitschek announced, ‘when 
in our hemisphere economic and social conditions prevail that lead to statism as a reflex of 
underdevelopment.’99 The US response was hewn from a predictable ideological standpoint. 
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Roy Rubottom, who had replaced Henry Holland as head of the State Department’s Latin 
American desk, told the Brazilian Ambassador in Washington: ‘Kubitschek’s speech 
unfortunately did not stress the importance of LA [Latin American] nations doing their part to 
more efficiently and effectively marshal their own and foreign private capital resources for 
development.’100 More forthright was Foster Dulles’s appraisal delivered in person to 
Kubitschek during a tour of Brazil in August. A day after telling Brazilian Foreign ministry 
officials that ‘use of government capital should be the exception, not the rule’ and that 
financing should be sought from either private sources or existing institutions like the IMF, 
Dulles told Kubitschek that it was ‘an oversimplification to say that the communist problem 
can be solved by solving the problem of underdevelopment’; ‘development of resources,’ he 
went on, ‘is primarily a job for private capital.’101 He expanded on these views in a letter 
dictated on his flight back to Washington. ‘The discussion of “underdevelopment”,’ Dulles 
stated, was a ‘little too much mechanistic, as though there were some measurable point which 
could be achieved and which if reached would enable further development safely to cease.’ 
Operation Pan America (OPA), he continued, should ‘concentrate primarily upon the 
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injecting into this hemisphere of increased determination to evolve peacefully but vigorously 
in a way which will improve the lot of all men.’102  
Strategically it would have benefited the US to support OPA more fully even if they 
did not accept the Kubitschek model completely. A broader level of cooperation – akin to that 
created by the Kennedy administration during the Alliance for Progress era – could have been 
engendered by working with Kubitschek’s idea more closely. Moreover the Eisenhower 
administration was by no means completely opposed to OPA as a political model; they were 
just unwilling to countenance any move that by proposing a more rapid model of 
development so directly opposed their own approach. With Dulles’s statements in August 
effectively marking the end of any prospect of close cooperation over Kubitschek’s proposal 
the US continued with its existing developmental policy, especially with regard to the 
stipulation that financial assistance would only be forthcoming once Brazil had reached an 
agreement with the IMF.
103
 As Roy Rubottom reiterated to Kubitschek’s Ambassador in 
April, 1959, ‘Agreement between the Government of Brazil and the International Monetary 
Fund on a sound program to combat inflation and to bring the balance of payments deficit 
into line would be an essential prerequisite to discussions looking to financial assistance from 
this government.’104  
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Negotiations between Brazil and the IMF, however, were on the brink of collapse by 
1959 and, in the absence of an agreement, Kubitschek asked Washington for the economic 
assistance needed to stave off pressing financial problems. The impossibility of an agreement 
between Brazil and the IMF stemmed from the Fund’s insistence that Brazil take steps on 
issues – such as exchange control – that Kubitschek believed would be politically impossible. 
In June, Kubitschek informed Ambassador Ellis Briggs that Brazil desperately needed $300 
million in balance of payments assistance and noted that, if the US refused, it might lead to ‘a 
graduated default of Brazil’s external obligations’ or ‘cost the US and Brazil their long 
friendship.’105 Once again, the US rejected Kubitschek’s request.106 On first glance it seems 
surprising that the administration was not prepared to be more flexible on this issue – 
especially when one factors in the events of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 and the impact 
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that Fidel Castro’s emergence had on the course of inter-American relations.107 By this stage, 
though, Eisenhower and his officials were viewing their economic and strategic goals as 
being broadly compatible. Their fiscal response to both the Soviet Economic Offensive and 
the Nixon trip had been a powerful restatement of existing developmental principles. 
Alterations and new approaches were designed to complement, not replace, the existing 
model. The same would be true of the developing crisis in US-Cuban relations: with Castro 
looking to challenge Washington’s model, the US response on the economic side was to 
reaffirm their commitment to their developmental agenda.
108
   
With no chance of persuading Washington to soften their stance on short-term 
economic assistance payments, therefore, Kubitschek broke off negotiations with the IMF in 
an effort to either force the US hand or have the freedom to pursue alternative routes. The 
IMF’s position – which the Eisenhower administration wholeheartedly agreed with – was 
that, ‘the proposed Brazilian stabilization program was not strong enough.’109 At the same 
time, however, US officials recognised the deleterious impact that their stance on 
development was having on the bilateral relationship. Accordingly the administration sought 
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to suppress a Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on Brazil and its financial record. In 
conversation with Senate staff consultant, Pat Holt, Rubottom reported that the Embassy in 
Rio wanted its release to be delayed ‘as Kubitschek will consider it a direct slap at him,’ at a 
time when the administration did not want to antagonise him any further.
110
 
Despite this recognition and the record of bilateral agreement between the US and 
Brazil on strategic issues, there was no change in the administration’s developmental 
position. With Kubitschek equally adamant that he could not alter his position – with ongoing 
financial and political difficulties ensuring the status quo – Washington began to oppose 
Kubitschek’s plan of anointing his successor in an effort to ensure he could return to office 
four years later.
111
 The upshot of Kubitschek’s plan, a State Department official reported to 
Rubottom, was that there was now ‘little chance that an agreement on a sound economic 
stabilization program will result from Brazilian talks with the IMF or that such a program 
would be implemented if undertaken.’ Furthermore, he went on, ‘the likelihood of the 
election’ of a president ‘who could be expected significantly to change present GOB policies 
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would therefore be correspondingly diminished.’112 Faced with this prospect, US officials 
continued to recommend that Washington stand firm against Brazilian intransigence. John 
Moors Cabot, who had replaced Ellis Briggs as the US Ambassador in Rio, reported: 
 
We [must] not permit Brazil to pressure us into receding from our position 
regarding balance of payments loans to Brazil…given the present financial 
policies and conditions in Brazil, a balance of payments loan would no good and 
might even do harm.  Brazil must be allowed to ‘stew in its own juice’ unless it’s 
willing to make financial reforms.
113
 
 
As manoeuvrings for the 1960 election in Brazil got underway, US appraisals 
continued to focus on economic issues. This had begun in early 1959 when Joao Goulart, 
Kubitschek’s vice president and one of front-runners for the election, voiced his support for a 
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move that threatened US commercial interests in Brazil.
114
 It had developed to such an extent 
by the summer that Cabot felt compelled to deliver a speech at the American Chamber of 
Commerce in Sao Paulo to ‘remind the Brazilians of the economic collaboration that the US 
has extended to Brazil, to point out that the US is not opposed to legitimate nationalism, and 
to suggest to Brazil that the way to get cooperation from the US is not to blatantly demand 
aid.’115 Tellingly the ongoing shift in US policy toward the region – which had seen a 
realignment in US interests as officials moved to tackle the emerging situation in Cuba – was 
having no impact on the rigidity of the administration’s economic position with respect to 
Brazil. 
Even a trip by Eisenhower to Brazil for the opening of a new interior capital at 
Brasilia – which, on the surface, was a public relations success – was the catalyst for behind 
the scenes wrangling over developmental issues. Matters had not been helped, of course, by 
the fact that Eisenhower was visiting other Latin American nations, too, or by the tone of 
some of Eisenhower’s speeches during his visit. But initial goodwill engendered by 
Eisenhower’s visit soon gave way to familiar disputes. During the trip, Cabot reported to 
Dulles’s replacement, Christian Herter, that Brazil had ‘forcefully reasserted its Operation 
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Pan America thesis advocating US finance of Latin American economic development,’ while 
a financial advisor to Kubitschek informed Herter that, during their acrimonious negotiations, 
the IMF had been ‘thinking in terms of conventional economics and not in terms of political 
necessities.’116 After the trip, the Embassy in Brazil warned that any post-trip upturn would 
not endure if it was not matched by ‘firm evidence of continuing US friendship and faith in 
Brazil.’117 For the Brazilians this would mean commitments of economic assistance to tide 
the nation through a difficult time; for the US, however, this remained unconscionable. After 
eight years of manoeuvring on this issue, the relationship had returned to where it had started 
– with the clash between a uniform ideological framework projected from Washington and 
more complex local circumstances as evident as ever.
118
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By 1961 it was clear that the Eisenhower administration had failed to implement its 
model of development in Brazil. Furthermore it had become the most divisive point in a 
bilateral relationship that was slowly becoming more acrimonious – a trend, that aside from a 
very few cases, was being repeated across the region.
119
 More importantly, in pursuing what 
we might class as an early form of modernization the Eisenhower administration had 
confronted a series of irreconcilable problems that deserved greater attention from their 
successors. For while there were undoubtedly problems with the methods used during 
Eisenhower’s two terms in office, it was far from clear that the wide-ranging difficulties 
encountered in Brazil could have been solved by adopting a different tack. 
Nonetheless the incoming Kennedy administration believed that their predecessors 
had failed because of their failure to adopt the correct measures in meeting Latin America 
expectations. Imbued with the same sense of paternalism toward Latin America as the 
Eisenhower administration, Kennedy and his advisors held that a more concerted aid effort in 
the region could, under US guidance, yield spectacular results.  In late-1960, Walt Rostow 
wrote a memorandum on the urgency of the situation in the Third World. ‘It is crucial to the 
Free World position,’ he wrote, ‘that the first days of the Kennedy Administration be used for 
a breakthrough on the question of aid to the under-developed nations.’ If this did not happen, 
Rostow cautioned, then ‘the odds are that we can not reverse the dangerous course of 
relations with the under-developed areas in the foreseeable future.’120  
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In his inaugural address shortly afterwards, Kennedy made a special promise to the 
Latin American nations that the US would ‘assist free men and free governments in casting 
off the chains of poverty’121 – a promise that was building upon recommendations made by a 
special pre-presidential task group, which had noted the need for the US to demonstrate their 
commitment to the region and to pursue social and democratic reforms through economic 
development.  
 
It is…necessary to demonstrate our break with past inadequate programs and 
dramatize our intention to organize a new ‘Alliance for Progress’ in the 
Americas…it is a realistic objective to bring the area within a decade into 
economic step with the modern world and to rely for further growth on its own 
resources and the normal flows of outside public and private capital.
122
 
 
Arthur Schlesinger Jr made a similar point in a report to Kennedy just before the Alliance for 
Progress was officially announced in March, 1961.’The US must act very soon,’ Schlesinger 
wrote, ‘to reverse the recent decline in Latin America's economic position, to counter the 
increasingly adroit efforts of the Communists to exploit this situation and to reinforce the 
middle-class parties before their credit runs out.’123 The belief that a forceful aid effort could 
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be utilised to improve the situation clearly characterised the Kennedy administration’s 
approach, as did the belief that the Eisenhower administration had been pursuing a flawed 
model that needed refining. The evidence presented here, however, suggests that this 
approach was mistaken; in replacing one ideological blueprint for another, the Kennedy 
administration was failing to understand the nature of the Eisenhower model or the fact that, 
in one respect, Eisenhower and his advisors had been right. 
The Alliance for Progress, of course, quickly fell into difficulties. By the time of 
Kennedy’s death in November 1963, the Alliance was seen to be faltering and was coming 
under attack from the media and disenchanted Latin Americans.
124
 The administration’s 
belief in the Rostovian blueprint of uniform modernisation was proven to be erroneous in an 
area as diverse as Latin America.
125
 In this they were not so very far removed from their 
predecessors; in fact they encountered similar problems, which undermined the critique of 
Eisenhower’s policies offered up by Rostow, Schlesinger and Kennedy’s pre-presidential task 
force. The Eisenhower administration’s lack of success in Brazil contained a valuable lesson 
for Kennedy-era modernisationists: it had failed to succeed despite the fact that, broadly 
speaking, successive Brazilian leaders accepted the central concept of encouraging 
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development via private investment. On an immediate level, the relationship fell down 
because of the administration’s refusal to countenance using short-term lending policies to 
alleviate recurrent problems. Yet there was little evidence that, even if this sticking point had 
been addressed, the impediments toward greater economic success would have been 
removed. Internal problems in Brazil would still have challenged the American model, while 
the slow-burning nature of Eisenhower’s developmental vision would have continued to 
frustrate Latin Americans eager to embrace modernity. In this respect, Eisenhower, Dulles 
and their advisors were correct: development would take a long time to take place in Latin 
America as it had in the United States. In their adherence to a singular developmental 
ideology, however, the Eisenhower administration was unwittingly undermining its regional 
approach. Without greater flexibility in this area, there was little chance of an inter-American 
concordat on a mutually agreeable way forward – a fact demonstrated in Brazil where two 
nations that ostensibly agreed on most issues were unable to forge an effective bilateral 
relationship. The greater irony, though, is that, ideologically committed or not, there may 
have been little that the administration could do to solve these complex issues in the short-
term. Herein lies the lesson that Kennedy, Rostow and similarly minded advisors should have 
taken from Eisenhower’s efforts in Brazil: not that the methods they were using were short-
sighted or lacking in ambition, but that the likelihood of success in applying a rigidly defined 
blueprint for development was, in itself, ill-conceived. 
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